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Abstract
Using Johansen and Granger-causality models on data from 1977 to 2007, we investigate 
long-term effects of population growth on investment.  Main findings are, in the long-run, 
population  growth  will:  (1)  decrease  foreign  and  public  investments  in  Ivory  Coast;  (2) 
increase  public  and  private  investments  in  Swaziland;  (3)  deplete  public  investment  but 
augment  domestic  investment  in  Zambia;  (4)  diminish  private  investment  and  improve 
domestic investment in the Congo Republic and Sudan respectively. For policy implications, 
the positive linkage of population growth to investment growth in the long-term should be 
treated  with  extreme  caution.  Family  planning  and  birth  control  policies  could  also  be 
considered in countries with little future investment avenues. 
JEL Classification: C30; J00; O10; O40.
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1.  Motivation
With respect to the World Bank (WB), our generation is experiencing the greatest 
demographic change in the history of mankind with Africa at its center. In the early 1970’s, 
there were two Europeans for one African, but it is projected that by 2030 there would be two 
Africans  for every European.  The African population  is  projected to double by 2036 and 
represent 20% of the world’s population by 2050(UN Worlds Population Prospects 2009). 
These statistics make the continent the fastest growing in the world. Concern over this rapid 
growth presents an important geo-economic concern to policy-makers, researchers and social 
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scientists. The main issues resulting there-from are, depleting per capita income and rising 
unemployment.
In an attempt to probe into the issue of unemployment, many analysts believe the three 
most  important  things  Africa  needs  are  investment,  investment  and  investment  (Dangote 
Group, 2008; IMF Survey, 2009). Dangote Group (2008) has unequivocally emphasized that 
Africa needs investment not aid. It has lamented over the rejection of products from Africa by 
multinationals  and urged companies  in  Africa  to  focus  more  on inter-African  trade.  This 
corporate policy counsel is shared by many analysts on economic concerns in the continent. In 
a recent IMF survey (April, 2009), analysts overwhelmingly expressed the need for foreign 
donors to focus more on investment avenues in Africa than on aid. This confirms the largely 
established sentiment that aid has short-run effects while sustainable investment could have 
much longer-term impacts. Like effects of sustainable investment, population growth is also 
seen to affect economic growth for the most part in the distant future. By the same token, 
there could be a long-run equilibrium between these two entities. 
In a bid to address growing concerns over how African demographic changes would 
be dealt with, it is imperative to investigate how long-term investments would accommodate 
rising unemployment:  the  object  of  this  paper.  Results  we shall  provide could  have very 
crucial  policy  implications;  as  they  would  account  for  which  investment  types  (public, 
private,  domestic  or  foreign)  could  best  contribute  to  decreasing  unemployment  rate, 
concurrently with population growth. 
To achieve these: we shall test for stationary properties of univariate series at country 
specific levels; derive first-orderly integrated variables on which their cointegration properties 
with productivity variables would be investigated; then based on long term equilibrium results 
obtained from cointegration tests,  we shall  either  investigate  causality relations  by simple 
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Granger(short  run) or  Vector Error Correction Models(VECMs).  Lastly,  we shall  discuss 
empirical results before providing their policy implications. 
2. Literature review
The  influence  of  demographic  changes  on  economic  growth  remains  quite  a 
controversial agenda in the literature of development economics. While some authors firmly 
establish a positive association of population growth with economic growth (Hondroyiannis 
and Papapetrou, 2005; Azomahou and Mishra, 2008), the question of why poor countries are 
trapped in a vicious cycle of high birth rates and low growth rates is quite puzzling.  
The contribution of population growth to economic development has been subject to 
many studies in literature. Very recently, Azomahou and Mishra (2008) revisited the impact 
of age dynamics on economic growth through age-structured population for both OECD and 
non OECD countries.  Findings reveal  that  between 1960 and 2000, mentioned economies 
developed  mostly  thanks  to  the  stock  of  human  capital.  They  further  reflect  that  in 
comparative terms, non OECD countries are likely to experiene higher birth rates than their 
OECD counter parts. The contribution of age-dynamics in their work is captured from the fact 
that,  work force  is  important  in  explaining  differences  in  growth between the  two set  of 
countries. From this study, we could infer: countries with higher work force would potentially 
experience higher growth rates than those with lower work force. At a much earlier epoque, 
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou(2005) in a study on the link between fertility and output in 
eight European countries found out that, increase in output would be associated with higher 
fertility rate. Judging from their panel study based on data obtained from 1960 to 1998, one 
could confirm their forecast today. In fact over the last decade, most European countries have 
experienced low fertility and growth rates. 
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As earlier emphasized, contrary to the positive association of high birth rate with high 
growth rate, an explanation as to why poor countries with high population growth remain 
trapped in a cycle of poverty could be found in classical and modern theories. Malthusian and 
neo-Malthusian theories explain this negative association through the depletion of per capita 
income. This could vividly be understood as a direct consequence of the population increasing 
faster than GDP. A  recent explanation to the negative association between growth and birth 
rates could be seen from Pommeret and Smith(2005). They conclude that growth rates are 
negatively correlated with birth rates because of productivity volatility that affect both rates. 
In a much recent study on trends from China, Hasan(2010) explains this negative link from an 
‘income-growth led family-growth’ nexus. His findings reveal, increasing per capita growth 
in China tends to lower population growth. To quote him in verbatim: “...as per capita income 
increases, families turn to prefer quality over quantity of children. The resultant increase in 
the cost of bearing and rearing children would induce smaller family size and lead to decline 
in  fertility”(page  360).Contrary to  the  situation  in  China,  developing and underdeveloped 
countries in Africa are experiencing a demographic explosion. 
 With the population projected to double by 2036 and represent about 20% of the 
world demography by 2050, Africa is the fastest growing continent. The concern of how to 
manage issues resulting from this growth is of paramount importance in geo-economic as well 
as national policies. It is well established that the continent best needs investment in order to 
provide employment to rising work force resulting from these demographic changes (Dangote 
Group, 2008; IMF Survey, 2009). Therefore, the effort of this study shall focus on evaluating 
how investment types (public, private, domestic and foreign) shall be affected by population 
growth in the long-run. Understandably, we should expect population growth elasticities of all 
categories  of  investments  to  be  positive;  with  private  and  foreign  investments  more 
responsive  than  public  investment.  Our  expectations  are  founded  on  projected  effects  of 
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structural adjustment policies  imposed on African countries by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) in the 1980’s1. Thus, one should expect public investment 
to be less sensitive to demographic change than private and foreign investments.  
The contribution of this work to literature could be summarized in the following :(1) 
we provide analyses on direct linkages between investment and population growth(contrary to 
abundant  ‘demographic  change-growth’  literature;  (2)  usage  of  a  plethora  of  investment 
indicators  provide  a  somewhat  robust  account  of  aggregate  investment  dynamics  on  the 
palaver; and  (3) goodness of fit of models  based on Vector Autoregression(VAR) processes 
is  ensured by the most  appropriate  optimal  lag selection  criteria(contrary to  arbitrary and 
discretional lag choices). 
3. Model and theoretical framework 
Lets us start with an aggregate investment production function:
βαWAKI =                                                                                                     (1)
where I is the investment variable,  A  is total factor productivity, K is capital stock, and W is 
the labour composite, which is representative of population growth rate. Hence, we could re-
write equation (1) in the natural log form in per capita terms as:
WKI logloglog βαθ ++=                                                                                         (2)
In equation 2,  physical  capital  (K) is  still  measured by gross fixed capital  formation  and 
human capital (W) by population growth rate. To take account of the time series nature of our 
study, we can hence re-reformulate equation (2) in per capita form for each country with‘t’ 
running from 1 to n: 
ttttt wkI logloglog ψαα ++=                                                                             (3).
1 To stretch this point, structural adjustment implied adopting economic measures that could favor; liberalization, 
privatization, progression towards market-based economies and reduction of public (government) role in 
economic activities.
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 It is interesting to state channels via which human capital could ameliorate investment. An 
investor for instance would consider the cost of labour as a production factor before deciding 
on where to invest. Since the cost of labour is determined by  its availability, from common 
sense and to some extend economic theory (demand and supply), countries which have  high 
growth rates in working force would ‘ceteris paribus’ experience low working wage. In the 
same vein, growth in work force should lead to cheaper labour cost, more investment and of 
course higher economic growth. This implies, in compliance with our hypothetical model (see 
equation  3),  there  should  be  is  a  positive  long-term  relationship  between  mentioned 
productivity factors and investment types. If we were to further suppose, aggregate production 
(GDP) is significantly endogenous to investment, then one could be impelled to infer that, our 
model  is  supported  empirically  by  “population-growth  economic-growth”  literature 
(Azomahou  and Mishra, 2008;  Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou,  2005).  Regarding short-run 
linkages,  we  don’t  expect  results  to  be  significant  because,  we  hypothetically  assume 
population growth should impact investment dynamics only in a distant future
4. Data and Econometric methodology
4.1 Data 
Data is got from the World Bank’s African Development indicators. Our limitation to 
a  span between  1977 and 2007 is  based  on  availability  of  data  and timing  of  structural 
adjustment policies imposed on African countries. Selected variables for investment dynamics 
include: Gross Foreign Direct Investment (FDI); Gross Public Investment (Public Ivt.); per 
capita Gross Private Investment (Private Ivt.); and Gross Domestic Investment (GDI). Factor 
productivity indicators are Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) for physical capital and 
Population  growth rate  (pop)  for  human capital.  Initially,  our  database  is  made  up of  38 
countries, but it is gradually trimmed down to investment dynamic panels due to constraints in 
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the cointegration theory2. Since our prime concern is to evaluate how human capital affects 
investment dynamics, the other productivity proxy (physical capital) should serve as a control 
variable for robustness check. 
4.2 Causality estimations
With respect to the Engle-Granger methodology (1987), short run estimations and long 
run estimators will be derived by simple Granger causality and Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) models respectively. 
4.2.1 Short run estimations
Suppose we consider a basic bivariate finite-order VAR model. As presented in 
equations (4) and (5) below, short-run (simple) granger causality consists of evaluating, how 
respectively , past values of physical capital (k) and human capital (w) could help past values 
of FDI in explaining present values of FDI. Since application of this requires stationary 
univariate series, for comparative reasons, its application will be on first differenced series. 
Consequently, resulting VAR models are: 
tjt
p
j
q
j
jjtjt kFDIFDI εδλ +∆+∆=∆ −
= =
−∑ ∑
1 0
'                                     (4)
tjt
p
j
q
j
jjtjt wFDIFDI εδλ +∆+∆=∆ −
= =
−∑ ∑
1 0
'                                    (5)
tjt
p
j
q
j
jjtjt FDIkk εδλ +∆+∆=∆ −
= =
−∑ ∑
1 0
'                                            (6)
tjt
p
j
q
j
jjtjt FDIww εδλ +∆+∆=∆ −
= =
−∑ ∑
1 0
'                                          (7)
2 For long-run elasticities to be estimated for a given country, factor productivity proxies must be integrated in  
the first order and cointegrated with investment variables. While integration requires exhibition of unit root at  
level  series  (and  therefore  stationarity  at  first  differenced  series),  cointegration  necessitates  showing  that, 
permanent changes in factor productivity variables affect investment proxies and vice versa. 
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With regard to our theoretical lay-out, VAR models relevant to our study are (4) and 
(5). Equations (6) and (7) are indicative of FDI granger causing physical capital and human 
capital respectively. The later sets of equations reflect the effects of investment dynamics on 
capital (physical and human); which is not what our research agenda aims to investigate (see 
equation 1). The null hypothesis of (4) consists of testing for zero restrictions in the VAR 
models and is captured by the F-statistic: which is the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis 
that parameters of lagged values of either ‘w’ or ‘k’ equals zero. Optimal lag selection is 
ensured by the AIC (Khim and Liew, 2004).  
4.2.2 Long run estimators
In a bid to illustrate short-run dynamics associated with the long-run equilibrium, let’s 
consider foreign direct investment (FDI), physical capital (k), and human capital (w), with no 
lagged difference, such that:
tt kFDI β=                                                                                                              (8)
tt wFDI β=                                                                                                              (9)
The following VECMs result from equations (8) and (9):
tttt kFDIFDI ,111 )( εβα +−=∆ −−                                                                   (10)
tttt FDIkk ,211 )(' εβα +−=∆ −−                                                              (11)
tttt wFDIFDI ,311 )('' εβα +−=∆ −−                                                             (12)
tttt FDIww ,411 )(''' εβα +−=∆ −−                                                           (13)
As was the case with short-run causality, long-run models that should be relevant to 
our research objectives are (10) and (12). The right hand terms represent the Error Correction 
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Terms (ECTs).  At equilibrium,  this  term has a zero value.  When the ECT is  not zero,  it 
implies  FDI  and  either  ‘k’  or  ‘w’  have  deviated  from  the  long-run  equilibrium  or 
cointegration  relation.  Thus,  ECTs adjust  each  variable  and partially  restore  the  equation 
relation. The speeds of these adjustments are determined by α and α’’ for physical and human 
capital  respectively.  Equations  (10 and 12) will  be replicated to all  remaining investment 
dynamics  (private,  public  and  domestic  investments).  The  same  deterministic  trend 
assumptions and optimal lag selection criterion used for cointegration tests shall be applied.
 
4.3 Derivation of integrated variables from country specific unit root tests
4.3.1 Country specific unit root tests
In our quest to apply the cointegration  theory,  we shall  first  endeavour to test  for 
stationary properties at country level.  In doing so, we correct for serial correlations using 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. We do not elaborate on the mechanics of the unit root 
test because it is widely applied and constitutes only an exploratory venture of our study. 
However, as we have pointed-out earlier, what is imperative to note in the specification of the 
VAR process is that, optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is based on Akaike Information 
Criterion  (AIC).  Our  choice  of  this  criterion  is  guided  by  Khim  and  Liew(2004)  who 
demonstrate that when observations are less than 60, the AIC and Final Prediction Error(FPE) 
are best  at specifying optimal  lags. Unit  root test  results are presented on tables 1 and 2. 
Variables of countries whose stationary properties match expectations of the cointegration 
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theory are seen in bold and could be retained as first orderly integrated. Their usage in our 
study would depend on a given selection criteria (see 4.3.2).
4.3.2 Derivation of first orderly integrated variables 
Based on results obtained from country unit root tests (see tables 1 and 2), our choice 
of countries that are first orderly integrated (in bold) will be guided by the following criteria:
-both factor productivity variables (human and physical capital) must exhibit unit root (non 
stationary) at level series and be first orderly integrated (first differenced stationarity);
-at least one investment proxy must be also non stationary at level series and first differenced 
stationary. 
Applying  above selection  process  to  all  countries  resulted  in  the derivation  of  six 
variable panels below (see table 3).  
Table 3: Derivation of countries with first orderly integrated variables:  I (1)
Asymmetric Panels 
Investment dynamics Productivity factors
Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 Panel 5 Panel 6
FDI Private  Ivt Public Ivt Domestic Ivt.  Labour(Pop) Capital(GFCF)
-Ivory Coast
-Congo Rep.
-Gambia
-Ghana
-Zambia
-Benin
-Ivory Coast
-Congo Rep.
-Gambia
-Ghana
-Malawi
-South Afri.
-Sudan 
-Swaziland
- Ivory Coast
-Congo Rep.
-Gambia
-Ghana
-Malawi
-Sudan
-Swaziland
-Tunisia
-Zambia
-Ivory Coast
-Congo Rep.
-Ghana
-Malawi
-South Afri.
-Sudan
-Swaziland
-Tunisia
-Zambia
-Benin
-Ivory Coast
-Congo Rep.
-Gambia
-Ghana
-Malawi
-South Afri.
-Sudan 
-Swaziland
-Tunisia
-Zambia
-Benin
-Ivory Coast
-Congo Rep.
-Gambia
-Ghana
-Malawi
-South Afri.
-Sudan 
-Swaziland
-Tunisia
-Zambia 
Source (authors synthesis)
An investment type and factor productivity variables could have a linear combination 
that is stationary (cointegrated).
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Table 1: ADF Statistics for country specific unit root tests (1997-2007) 
Countries
Foreign Investment Private Investment Public Investment
Level First difference Level First difference Level First difference
c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct
Algeria -2.992* -13.13*** n.a n.a -2.501 -3.190 -2.956* -2.881 -1.777 -1.722 -3.716*** -3.708**
Benin -4.806*** -5.956**** n.a n.a -0.900 -2.553 -3.814** -3.838** -3.690** -3.647* n.a n.a
Botswana -2.248 -3.547* -7.304*** -7.171*** -2.583 -3.022 -3.336** -3.410* -3.128** -2.069 -4.336** -6.079***
Burundi -4.417*** -4.305** n.a n.a -2.058 -2.071 -5.711*** -5.590*** -1.853 -2.751 -6.145*** -6.005***
Cameroon -2.403 -2.402 -10.66*** -10.44*** -5.180*** -4.311*** n.a n.a -2.177 -3.007 -3.088** -3.035
CAR -1.049 -10.39*** -4.223*** -3.894** -4.222*** -4.124** n.a n.a -3.464** -3.930** -6.938*** -7.195***
Chad -3.702** -3.308 -3.171** -2.717 -1.612 -2.545 -2.695* -2.528 -2.073 -2.340 -4.316*** -4.802***
Côte d’Iv. -2.133 -2.661 -7.098*** -6.970*** -2.328 -2.256 -9.711*** -4.365** -1.554 -2.008 -4.955*** -4.949***
Congo R. -0.995 -2.079 -4.660*** -3.639* -1.748 -1.229 -8.228*** -8.494*** -3.324** -3.264 -3.281** -3.416*
Egypt -2.062 -0.858 -3.385** -3.555* -2.594 -2.515 -3.056** -3.021 -1.186 -4.171** -5.739*** -5.584***
Burkina F. -7.635*** -8.338*** n.a n.a -1.712 -3.022 -4.802*** -4.638*** -1.475 -2.443 -5.919*** -5.814***
Gabon -2.721* -2.651 -7.243*** -7.198*** -1.983 -2.889 -2.800* -2.778 -4.625*** -4.566*** -4.625*** -4.566***
Gambia 0.319 -1.888 -13.361*** -14.000*** -2.064 -2.457 -5.060*** -4.938*** -2.877* -3.129 -4.660*** -4.515***
Ghana -0.593 -3.096 -4.776*** -4.920*** 0.755 -4.865*** -5.705*** -5.817*** -2.364 -2.330 -3.498** -3.353*
Guinea -2.849* -2.826 -3.801** -3.726* -1.801 -1.707 -4.392*** -4.348*** -0.576 -3.438* -6.727*** -7.292***
Kenya -3.966*** -4.701*** n.a n.a -1.314 -1.356 -5.578*** -5.762*** -1.653 -1.541 -4.276*** -4.251**
Lesotho -3.119** -3.198 -6.795*** -6.697*** -1.279 -1.125 -4.190*** -4.385*** -2.052 -2.386 -4.038*** -3.837**
Madagascar -0.990 -5.213*** -5.053*** -4.906*** 2.056 0.336 -6.365*** -3.985** -3.245** -3.573* -3.861*** -3.732**
Malawi -3.424** -3.992** n.a n.a -2.014 -1.946 -5.941*** -5.832*** -2.570 -1.980 -4.908*** -5.806***
Mali -2.813* -3.646** n.a n.a -3.742** -4.841*** n.a n.a -2.649* -4.355** n.a n.a
Morocco -1.434 -8.603*** -15.199*** -14.922*** 0.116 -2.320 -5.022*** -3.875** -3.817*** -2.959 -4.956*** -5.706***
Mozambique -1.924 -2.610 -4.535*** -4.469** -1.833 -1.553 -10.486*** -5.564*** -3.034** -3.288* n.a n.a
Mauritania -5.683*** -4.794*** n.a n.a -0.970 -3.269 -3.309* -3.542 -6.762*** -0.261 -3.444** -5.162**
Mauritius -4.188*** -4.414*** n.a n.a -2.866* -2.898 -2.969** -2.890 -1.758 -1.485 -5.223*** -5.525***
Namibia -2.836* -4.079** n.a n.a -1.616 -3.869** -6.721*** -6.651*** -3.784*** -2.956 -7.717*** -8.387***
Niger -3.577** -3.468* n.a n.a 0.153 -1.056 -4.371*** -5.146*** -4.232*** -3.347* n.a n.a
Rwanda -0.721 0.281 n.s.a n.s.a -1.006 -1.843 -3.741** -3.635* -1.871 -2.323 -4.951*** -4.991***
South Africa -4.072*** -4.210** n.a n.a -3.233** -1.215 -4.555*** -5.331*** -3.401** -8.925*** n.a n.a
Senegal -1.771 -5.327*** -10.147*** -10.042*** -2.394 -3.358* -6.470*** -6.367*** 2.193 0.471 -6.622*** -7.693***
Seychelles 1.173 -0.584 -1.721 -2.221 -2.627 -2.862 -5.399*** -5.324*** -4.070*** -3.752** n.a n.a
Sierra Leone -4.986*** -5.432*** n.a n.a -2.146 -1.253 -7.489*** -8.351*** -3.457** -3.403* n.a n.a
Sudan -0.836 -1.999 -2.515 -3.193 -2.471 -3.074 -5.591*** -5.461*** -1.052 0.267 -3.515** -4.469***
Swaziland -3.953*** -3.932** n.a n.a -1.882 -4.716*** -5.570*** -5.739*** -3.237** -2.996 -10.754*** -10.734***
Togo -3.275** -3.206 -10.037*** -11.202*** -1.356 -2.764 -5.607*** -5.556*** -3.688** -4.169** n.a n.a
Tunisia -3.638** -4.201** n.a n.a -5.087*** -4.992*** n.a n.a -1.952 -1.650 -3.872*** -3.810**
Uganda 0.745 -1.647 -5.071*** -5.564*** -0.430 -3.607* -6.531*** -6.354*** -3.537** -3.585* n.a n.a
Zambia -1.646 -4.351** -5.833*** -5.627*** -0.799 -1.606 -1.674 -1.922 -1.576 -1.389 -3.872** -3.697*
Zimbabwe -2.124 -2.381 -6.413*** -4.171*** -2.862* -2.986 -5.288*** -5.098*** -3.448** -3.547* n.a n.a
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Maximum lag is 3 and optimal lags are chosen via AIC. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ ;respectively. n.a: not applicable; n.s.a: not 
specifically applicable.
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Table 2: ADF Statistics for country specific unit root tests continued (1997-2007) 
Countries
Domestic Investment Physical Capital Human Capital
Level First difference Level First difference Level First difference
c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct c ct
Algeria -2.853* -1.465 -2.901* -6.147*** -2.624 -2.100 -5.992*** -6.502*** -1.632 -1.825 -1.960 -2.123
Benin -3.406** -3.549* n.a n.a -0.717 -8.603*** -8.045*** -7.778*** -2.097 -1.344 -8.902*** -9.263***
Botswana -2.574 -2.745 -3.820*** -3.853** -2.888* -3.550* n.a n.a -0.539 -2.806 -1.763 -1.494
Burundi -1.390 -2.703 -7.960*** -7.813*** -1.747 -1.941 -6.800*** -6.687*** -3.580** -3.681** n.a n.a
Cameroon -2.231 -1.670 -6.562*** -6.797*** -4.582*** -3.918** n.a n.a 2.257 -0.558 -1.089 -2.448
CAR -3.458** -3.552* n.a n.a -3.774*** -3.772** n.a n.a -1.119 -2.339 -2.514 -3.093
Chad -1.557 -3.646** -4.374*** -4.340** -1.641 -3.094 -3.893*** -3.801** -1.072 0.594 -0.015 -0.760
Côte d’Iv. -1.831 -1.479 -4.469*** -4.746*** -1.786 -1.467 -5.279*** -5.810*** -1.166 -4.242** -3.326** -3.098
Congo R. -2.626* -2.931 -4.527*** -4.436*** -2.607 -3.058 -4.552*** -4.471*** -1.131 -1.214 -2.813* -2.882
Egypt -1.577 -3.397* -4.159*** -4.080** -2.112 -3.309* -5.121*** -4.995*** -1.567 -3.334* -2.155 -1.737
Burkina F. -2.607 -2.591 -6.795*** -6.659*** -2.440 -2.540 -7.057*** -6.987*** -1.916 0.279 -1.268 -2.452
Gabon -4.679*** -5.192*** n.a n.a -3.604** -4.003** n.a n.a -1.755 -2.397 -1.461 -0.971
Gambia -6.293*** -6.443*** n.a n.a -2.970* -2.951 -4.710*** -5.053*** -1.143 -1.553 -1.063 -6.523***
Ghana 0.693 -2.689 -6.230*** -6.482*** 0.518 -4.130** -5.783*** -5.936*** 0.689 -7.314*** -4.253*** -13.654***
Guinea -1.089 -2.281 -4.313*** -4.529*** -1.099 -2.429 -4.427*** -4.576*** -2.126 -2.591 -1.858 -1.834
Kenya -2.951* -4.360*** n.a n.a -4.559*** -4.264** n.a n.a -1.286 -3.203 -2.379 -2.347
Lesotho -1.418 -1.062 -5.029*** -5.079*** -1.358 -0.959 -5.260*** -5.012*** 0.247 -2.079 -1.439 -1.615
Madagascar -0.666 -1.844 -6.443*** -6.589*** -0.175 -1.294 -4.984*** -5.086*** -2.804* -1.276 -1.420 -2.755
Malawi -2.743* -2.721 -7.796*** -8.042*** -2.353 -2.173 -6.527*** -6.812*** -1.506 -2.249 -3.115** -3.083
Mali -1.727 -3.703** -8.364*** -8.225*** -1.755 -3.714** -8.390*** -8.256*** -1.425 -4.472*** -2.688* -2.515
Morocco -2.197 -2.636 -6.075*** -4.151** -2.414 -2.845 -5.605*** -3.953** 9.587 17.212 6.654 -1.825
Mozambique -2.632* -2.994 -4.386*** -4.814*** -2.632* -2.994 -4.386*** -4.814*** -2.199 -2.247 -2.074 -1.976
Mauritania -1.798 -1.725 -8.590*** -8.442*** -4.263*** -4.263** n.a n.a -3.352** -0.473 0.722 1.593
Mauritius -3.148** -3.078 -2.572 -2.499 -3.964*** -4.241** n.a n.a -2.106 -2.215 -5.884*** -5.787***
Namibia -3.792*** -3.797** n.a n.a -2.748* -3.426* n.a n.a -2.247 -2.351 -1.532 -1.050
Niger -3.687** -1.413 -2.927* -3.957** -1.011 -2.356 -3.214** -4.414*** -1.786 1.899 0.707 0.138
Rwanda -0.843 -1.908 -9.900*** -10.020*** -1.551 -2.661 -5.820 -6.028*** -2.588 -2.565 -2.479 -2.425
South Africa -1.838 -1.486 -4.575*** -4.814*** -1.545 -0.106 -3.000** -3.665** -0.780 -2.345 -3.921*** -4.218**
Senegal -0.531 -1.005 -6.304*** -6.651*** -0.934 -2.539 -6.392*** -6.316*** -1.544 -3.545* -2.427 -2.277
Seychelles -3.149** -3.003 -7.251*** -7.308*** -3.135** -2.985 -7.066*** -7.132*** -5.342*** -5.282*** n.a n.a
Sierra Leone -2.127 -1.534 -8.211*** -9.493*** -1.738 -1.628 -8.488*** -9.725*** -2.472 -2.335 -2.380 -2.424
Sudan -1.201 -3.519* -5.354*** -4.802*** -1.478 -1.779 -5.843*** -5.873*** -1.686 -2.757 -2.758* -2.813
Swaziland -3.978*** -2.327 -5.158*** -5.353*** -2.999** -2.337 -5.143*** -4.751*** 0.105 -2.112 -1.506 -9.394***
Togo -2.172 -2.227 -6.221*** -6.728*** -3.531** -3.238* n.a n.a -2.367 -3.489* -2.521 -2.461
Tunisia -2.402 -4.300** -5.484*** -5.354*** -2.379 -2.936 -3.847*** -3.797** -0.958 -4.634*** -5.188*** -5.083***
Uganda -0.160 -4.807*** -6.668*** -6.541*** -0.819 -3.649** -4.977*** -4.866*** -2.961* -3.015 -1.804 -1.834
Zambia -2.827* -1.636 -4.750*** -6.064*** -1.222 -2.265 -5.203*** -5.980*** 1.468 -1.659 -10.479*** -11.040***
Zimbabwe -2.347 -2.318 -5.426*** -5.378*** -3.385** -3.358* n.a n.a -2.016 -0.994 -4.318*** -0.505
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Maximum lag is 3 and optimal lags are chosen via AIC. ‘c’ and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ ;respectively. n.a: not  
applicable; n.s.a: not specifically applicable
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 4.4 Cointegration tests 
Long run equilibrium relationships between sequences could be determined by various 
methods. Compared to cointegration tests proposed by ‘Engle and Granger’ (1987) and ‘Stock 
and Watson’ (1988), we choose to use Johansen (1995a, 1995b) because it has more desirable 
properties;  withstanding  the  fact  that  all  tested  variables  are  treated  as  endogenous.  This 
method consists of testing restrictions imposed by cointegration on the VAR in the series. 
Between the two tests at our disposal (trace statistics and maximum Eigen value), we shall  
report both but based our decisions only on the trace statistics in a bid to obtain more robust 
results  (Cheung  and  Lai,  1993).  Borrowing  from Ahking  (2001),  we  argue  that  when  a 
deterministic  trend3 is  included  in  the  co-integration  model,  results  are  less  favorable. 
However, robust results are obtained with the exclusion of a linear deterministic trend in the 
model.  This  is  logical  in  the  perspective  that,  the  cointegration  model  is  based  on  the 
difference of the series which has been de-trended in the stationary process. Beyond this fact, 
Johansen (1995b) on the one hand, and Hansen and Juselius (1995) on the other hand, have 
cautioned  on  a  model  based  on  the  absence  of  a  linear  trend4.  As  justified  above,  our 
cointegration model will have only an intercept in the cointegration (level) and none in the 
VAR (first difference) equations.
As tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 illustrate, paired majority of variables exhibiting unit 
root fail to demonstrate the existence of long-run equilibrium (cointegration). In some cases 
(e.g Labour for Zambia on Table 4), where the cointegration rank(r) is equal to the number 
endogenous variables, the cointegration vector is invertible and the processes are all stationary 
at level; I(0).  Where the r =0(e.g Capital for Zambia on Table 4), the processes are all I(1) 
3 Consistent with deterministic components in time series, but less relevant from the visual-graphical perspective 
of our dataset.
4 They argue that, the minimum deterministic component in the model could be a constant in the co-integrating 
space to account for differences in measurement units. Logic and common sense, and to some extend economic 
theory help us in understanding: even if we hadn’t the ambition of including a constant in the co-integration 
equation, the presence of any I(1) variables in the VEC  requires the presence of an intercept in the model.
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and not cointegrated. However, cointegration occurs (e.g Capital for Ghana on Table 4) when 
“r” is between zero and the number of endogenous variables (0<r<n). 
Table 4: Cointegration test for Foreign Investment-factor Productivity
Countries Variables Model Sp.
Max(AIC)
Rank of CE Eigen 
Value
Trace test Lmax test
Ivory Coast
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.189
0.140
10.838
  4.551
6.286
4.551
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.453
0.199
23.173***
6.2473
16.926***
  6.247
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.615
0.422
0.232
49.512***
22.785***
  7.416
26.727***
15.368***
  7.416
Congo R
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.154
0.066
6.870
1.991
4.879
1.991
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.232
0.063
8.919
1.762
7.157
1.762
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.348
0.182
0.057
18.596
7.043
1.593
11.553
  5.449
  1.593
Gambia
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.417
0.152
14.820
3.471
11.349
3.471
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.226
0.084
9.316
2.373
6.942
2.373
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.822
0.484
0.153
53.711***
17.394
3.491
36.317***
13.902
3.491
Ghana
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.497
0.117
22.760**
3.484
19.275**
3.484
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.329
 0.157
15.976 
4.800
11.176
 4.800
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.699
0.442
0.177
55.447***
21.820**
5.476
33.627***
16.344**
5.476
Zambia
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.354
0.028
13.537
0.828
12.708
0.828
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.749
0.396
50.993***
13.618***
37.375***
13.618***
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.771
0.458
0.300
66.031***
26.232***
9.667**
39.799***
16.564**
9.667**
Note that ‘n.a’ denotes the invalidity of the test because level series of variable is not stationary at least, at 1% or 5% significance level for  
both ‘intercept’ and ‘intercept and trend categories. (***),(**) and (*) respectively depict; a very strong hypothesis against H0(P<0.01), 
moderate  evidence  against  H0(0.01<=P<0.05),  and  suggestive  evidence  against  H0(0.05<=P<0.1);  on  the  number  of  co-integrating 
equations (CE). The test was conducted with the assumption of a restricted constant in the CE and no trend in both the CE and VAR 
equations. Optimal lags are based on AIC, and their maximum (Max) lag lengths three. Lmax: Maximum Eigen value test. 
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Table 5: Cointegration test for Private Investment-factor Productivity
Countries Variables Model Sp.
Max(AIC)
Rank of CE Eigen 
Value
Trace test Lmax test
Benin
Capital 3(2) 0
1
0.724
0.180
25.313***
3.382
21.930***
3.382
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.549
0.521
24.524**
11.781**
12.743
11.781**
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.903
0.783
0.564
75.176***
37.817***
13.318***
37.360***
24.499***
13.318***
Ivory Coast
Capital 3(2) 0
1
0.444
0.215
24.089**
7.027
17.061**
7.027
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.520
0.362
33.185***
12.605***
20.580***
12.605***
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.801
0.465
0.240
70.531***
25.280***
7.715*
45.250***
17.565**
7.715
Congo R
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.362
0.223
15.475
5.565
9.909
5.565
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.623
0.187
23.694**
4.147
19.547**
4.147
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0,662
0,492
0,262
41,378***
19,656*
6,081
21.722*
13.574
6.081
Gambia
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.391
0.230
17.461
6.021
11.439
6.021
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.518
0.066
16.789
1.443
15.346*
1.443
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.696
0.361
0.171
38.411**
13.392
3.958
25.019**
9.432
3.958
Ghana
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.340
0.199
13.419
4.662
8.756
4.662
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.697
0.480
38.904***
13.771***
25.133***
13.771***
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.736
0.656
0.198
55.076***
27.048***
4.637
28.028***
22.411***
4.637
Malawi
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.258
0.198
15.603
6.633
8.969
6.633
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.328
0.063
12.977
  1.844
11.133
  1.844
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.565
0.347
0.064
37.154**
13.837
1.866
23.317**
11.970
1.866
South   Africa
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.951
0.251
92.856**
 8.112*
84.744***
 8.112*
Labour 3(1) 0
1
0.381
0.098
17.552
3.117
14.434*
3.117
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.975
0.390
0.073
119.40***
15.985
2.136
103.42***
13.848
  2.136
Sudan
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.247
0.018
9.070
0.548
8.521
0.548
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.328
0.194
17.197
6.058
11.138
6.058
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.560
0.361
0.152
40.187**
17.183
4.642
23.004**
12.540
4.642
Swaziland
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.407
0.239
22.325**
7.659*
14.666*
7.659*
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.505
0.181
25.299***
5.605
19.693**
5.605
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.655
0.379
0.152
47.835***
17.985
4.638
29.850***
13.347
4.6382
Note that ‘n.a’ denotes the invalidity of the test because level series of variable is not stationary at least, at 1% or 5% significance level for  
both ‘intercept’ and ‘intercept and trend categories. (***),(**) and (*) respectively depict; a very strong hypothesis against H0(P<0.01), 
moderate  evidence  against  H0(0.01<=P<0.05),  and  suggestive  evidence  against  H0(0.05<=P<0.1);  on  the  number  of  co-integrating 
equations (CE). The test was conducted with the assumption of a restricted constant in the CE and no trend in both the CE and VAR 
equations. Optimal lags are based on AIC, and their maximum (Max) lag lengths three. Lmax: Maximum Eigen value test. 
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Table 6: Cointegration test for Public Investment-factor Productivity
Countries Variables Model Sp.
Max(AIC)
Rank of CE Eigen 
Value
Trace test Lmax test
Ivory Coast
Capital 3(2) 0
1
0.442
0.221
24.230**
7.275
16.955**
7.275
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.492
0.234
26.444***
7.471
18.973**
7.471
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.798
0.465
0.237
70.039***
25.138***
7.608*
44.901***
17.530**
7.608*
Congo R
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.362
0.223
15.475
5.565
9.909
5.565
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.459
0.376
21.750**
9.441**
12.308
9.441**
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.662
0.492
0.262
41.378***
19.656*
6.081
21.722*
13.574
6.081
Gambia
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.391
0.230
17.461
6.021
11.439
6.021
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.424
0.228
19.492*
6.237
13.255
6.237
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.696
0.361
0.171
38.411**
13.392
3.958
25.019**
9.432
3.958
Ghana
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.340
0.199
13.419
4.662
8.756
4.662
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.646
0.343
30.674***
8.837*
21.836***
8.837*
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.736
0.656
0.198
55.076***
27.048***
4.637
28.028***
22.411***
4.637
Malawi
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.274
0.181
15.610
6.003
9.606
6.003
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.481
0.052
19.901*
1.498
18.402**
1.498
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.623
0.364
0.067
42.004***
14.647
  1.959
27.357***
12.687
  1.959
Sudan
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.268
0.016
9.894
0.497
9.396
0.497
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.289
0.219
16.487
6.922
9.564
6.922
Capital
Labour
3(1) 0
1
2
0.465
0.271
0.133
30.460
12.909
4.021
17.551
8.887
4.021
Swaziland
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.407
0.239
22.325**
7.659*
14.666*
7.659*
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.411
0.154
19.550*
4.704
14.846*
4.704
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.655
0.379
0.152
47.835***
17.985
4.638
29.850***
13.347
4.638
Tunisia
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.653
0.260
28.579***
6.340
22.238***
6.340
Labour 3(1) 0
1
0.240
0.181
10.931
4.612
6.319
4.612
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.760
0.352
0.196
43.762***
13.728
4.595
30.033***
9.132
4.595
Zambia
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.350
0.081
8.766
1.436
7.329
1.436
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.836
0.212
30.763***
3.588
27.175***
3.588
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.979
0.669
0.438
83.395***
25.277***
   8.662*
58.118***
16.614**
  8.662*
Note that ‘n.a’ denotes the invalidity of the test because level series of variable is not stationary at least, at 1% or 5% significance level for  
both ‘intercept’ and ‘intercept and trend categories. (***),(**) and (*) respectively depict; a very strong hypothesis against H0(P<0.01), 
moderate  evidence  against  H0(0.01<=P<0.05),  and  suggestive  evidence  against  H0(0.05<=P<0.1);  on  the  number  of  co-integrating 
equations (CE). The test was conducted with the assumption of a restricted constant in the CE and no trend in both the CE and VAR 
equations. Optimal lags are based on AIC, and their maximum (Max) lag lengths three. Lmax: Maximum Eigen value test. 
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.Table 7: Cointegration test for Domestic Investment-factor Productivity
Countries Variables Model Sp.
Max(AIC)
Rank of CE Eigen 
Value
Trace test Lmax test
Ivory Coast
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.494
0.382
32.612***
13.496***
19.116**
13.496***
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.433
0.278
25.053***
9.148**
15.905**
9.148**
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.548
0.439
0.334
49.925***
27.653***
11.422**
22.271**
16.231**
11.422**
Congo R
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.383
0.136
18.929*
4.400
14.528*
4.400
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.307
0.122
13.973
3.669
10.304
3.669
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.634
0.256
0.160
41.385***
13.209
4.903
28.176***
8.305
4.903
Ghana
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.434
0.165
20.996**
5.049
15.946**
5.049
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.567
0.288
32.995***
9.540**
23.455***
9.540**
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.696
0.417
0.231
55.864***
22.521**
7.379
33.343***
15.141*
7.379
Malawi
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.477
0.175
25.263***
5.803
19.459**
5.803
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.354
0.046
13.585
1.339
12.246
  1.339
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.658
0.368
0.066
44.904***
14.789
  1.916
30.115***
12.872
   1.916
South Africa
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.691
0.106
38.639***
3.380
35.259***
3.380
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.197
0.078
9.077
2.466
6.610
2.466
Capital
Labour
3(1) 0
1
2
0.704
0.214
0.116
47.504***
10.981
  3.719
36.523***
7.261
3.719
Sudan
Capital 3(1) 0
1
0.242
0.104
11.657
3.317
8.339
3.317
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.358
0.197
18.572*
6.156
12.416
6.156
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.629
0.270
0.103
39.705**
11.878
3.044
27.827***
8.834
3.044
Swaziland
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.641
0.253
36.887***
8.199*
28.688***
8.199*
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.429
0.277
24.837***
9.109*
15.727*
9.109*
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.711
0.521
0.285
64.860***
30.067***
  9.405**
34.793***
20.661***
9.405**
Tunisia
Capital 3(2) 0
1
0.456
0.216
24.767***
7.0762
17.691**
7.076
Labour 3(2) 0
1
0.280
0.086
12.157
2.621
9.536
2.621
Capital
Labour
3(2) 0
1
2
0.485
0.280
0.091
31.632
12.343
2.794
19.289
9.548
2.794
Zambia
Capital 3(3) 0
1
0.505
0.046
22.553***
1.413
21.139***
1.413
Labour 3(3) 0
1
0.628
0.139
31.961***
4.211
27.749***
4.211
Capital
Labour
3(3) 0
1
2
0.724
0.483
0.226
61.794***
25.692***
7.195
36.102***
18.496**
7.195
Note that ‘n.a’ denotes the invalidity of the test because level series of variable is not stationary at least, at 1% or 5% significance level for  
both ‘intercept’ and ‘intercept and trend categories. (***),(**) and (*) respectively depict; a very strong hypothesis against H0(P<0.01), 
moderate  evidence  against  H0(0.01<=P<0.05),  and  suggestive  evidence  against  H0(0.05<=P<0.1);  on  the  number  of  co-integrating 
equations (CE). The test was conducted with the assumption of a restricted constant in the CE and no trend in both the CE and VAR 
equations. Optimal lags are based on AIC, and their maximum (Max) lag lengths three. Lmax: Maximum Eigen value test. 
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Table 8: Causality analysis 
Countries
     Goodness of Fit Labour led(cause)  FDI Capital led(cause)  FDI      Goodness of Fit Labour led(cause) PriI Capital led(cause)   PriI
1st dif. Level Short run
(1st dif.)
Long run
(Level)
Short run
(1st dif.)
Long  run 
(Level)
1st dif. Level Short run
(1st dif.)
Long run
(Level)
Short run
(1st dif.)
Long  run 
(Level)
AIC AIC:CE F-Statsª ECT(t-stats) 
º
F-Statsª ECT(t-stats) 
º
AIC AIC:CE F-Statsª ECT(t-
stats) º
F-Statsª ECT(t-
stats) º
Benin n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 3(2)/3(2) 3(3) :0/3(2) :1 1.279 n.c 4.826** 0.207
(0.840)
Ivory Coast 3(3)/3(1) 3(3):1/3(1) :0 1.600 -0,007***
(-4,250)
0.750 n.c 3(2)/3(1) 3(3) :0/3(2) :1 0.222 n.c 0.022 -0.220***
(-4,191)
Congo Rep. 3(3)/3(1) 3(3):0/3(1) :0 1.662 n.c 0.181 n.c 3(3)/3(1) 3(3) :1/3(1) :0 0.438 -0.012***
(-4.748)
0.813 n.c
Gambia 3(3)/3(1) 3(3):0/3(3) :0 1.003 n.c 0.807 n.c 3(3)/3(1) 3(3) :0/3(1) :0 2.328 n.c 0.001 n.c
Ghana 3(2)/3(3) 3(3):0/3(3) :1 0.049 n.c 3.853** -2.459**
(-2.377)
3(3)/3(3) 3(3) :0/3(3) :0 0.287 n.c 0.284 n.c
Malawi n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 3(2)/3(1) 3(3) :0 /3(1) :0 0.476 n.c 1.809 n.c
South Afri n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 3(1)/3(1) 3(1) :0/3(1) :0 0.618 n.c 2.811 n.c
Sudan n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 3(2)/3(1) 3(3) :0/3(1) :0 1.748 n.c 0.092 n.c
Swaziland n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 3(3)/3(2) 3(3) :1/3(3) :0 1.160 0.008***
(4.234)
0.711 n.c
Zambia 3(3)/3(1) 3(3):0/3(1) :0 0.791 n.c 1.761 n.c n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Goodness of Fit Labour led(cause) PubI Capital led(cause)  PubI Goodness of Fit Labour led(cause)GDI Capital led(cause) GDI
Ivory Coast 3(2)/3(1) 3(3) :1 /3(2) :1 0.209 -0.001***
(-4.594)
4.745** 0.203***
(4.176)
3(2)/3(2) 3(3) :0/3(3) :0 0.107 n.c 0.479 n.c
Congo Rep. 3(2)/3(1) 3(3) :0 /3(1) :0 0.266 n.c 0.288 n.c 3(2)/3(1) 3(3) :0/3(1) :1 0.036 n.c 0.450 0.090 
(0.069)
Gambia 3(3)/3(3) 3(3) :1 /3(1) :0 1.210 0.003
(1.406)
0.843 n.c n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Ghana 3(3)/3(3) 3(3) :0 /3(3) :0 2.377 n.c 2.826* n.c 3(2)/3(2) 3(3) :0/3(3) :1 3.426** n.c 0.376 -3.579*
(-1.795)
Malawi 3(3)/3(1) 3(3) :1 /3(1) :0 0.751 0.001
(0.151)
0.041 n.c 3(3)/3(1) 3(3) :0/3(1) :1 0.844 n.c 0.443 -0.374
(-0.846)
South 
Africa
n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 3(1)/3(2) 3(3) :0/3(1) :1 0.202 n.c 1.885 0.422***
(3.776)
Sudan 3(2)/3(1) 3(3) :0 /3(1) :0 0.000 n.c 0.414 n.c 3(3)/3(2) 3(3) :1/3(1) :0 1.519 0.001*
(2.019)
0.009 n.c
Swaziland 3(3)/3(2) 3(3) :1 /3(3) :0 1.720 0.010***
(3.896)
0.380 n.c 3(3)/3(3) 3(3) :0/3(3) :0 2.616* n.c 6.278*** n.c
Tunisia 3(1)/3(1) 3(3) :0 /3(1) :1 0.049 n.c 4.311* -0.260
(-0.975)
3(1)/3(2) 3(2) :0/3(2) :1 1.299 n.c 2.104 -0.279
(-0.828)
Zambia 3(2)/3(1) 3(3) :1 /3(1) :0 2.553 -0.010***
(-4.846)
0.695 n.c 3(2)/3(1) 3(3) :1/3(1) :1 1.399 0.0001***
(6.077)
0.307 -0.311
(-1.059)
ª (F-Stats) F-statistics (Wald statistics) test the significance of lagged values of the independent variables. ° (ECT/t-stats) Error Correction term and t-ratios. Asterisks indicate the following levels of significance :***, 
1%; **; 5% and *; 10%. Maximum lag is 3 and optimal lags are chosen via AIC. s.l and n.a indicate “stationary at level” and “not applicable” respectively. 1st dif: First difference. Max: Maximum. CE: Cointegration 
Equation. n.c: no cointegration. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment.  PriI: Private Investment. PubI: Public Investment. GDI: Gross Domestic Investment.
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4.5 Panel causality analysis
Given cointegration results obtained, we have proceeded with estimating short term 
dynamics for each cointegrated pair. From table 8 it could be observed that, in the long-run, 
population growth will: decrease FDI investment in Ivory Coast, diminish private investment 
in Congo Republic and, improve private investment in Swaziland. Not unexpected, no short-
run  causality  result  is  significant;  this  confirms  our  initial  hypothesis  that,  demographic 
changes mostly have long-term economic effects. Also, population growth decreases public 
investment in Ivory Coast and Zambia but not in Swaziland; domestic investment crops up in 
Sudan and Zambia with population rise. In the short-term only Ghana and Swaziland turn to 
experience changes in domestic investment with positive demographic fluctuations. 
5. Discussion of results and policy implications
5.1 Discussion of results
Understandably,  all investment types should increase with population. However we 
expected population growth elasticities of private and foreign investments to be higher than 
that of public investment. The reason for this difference in expectation stems from structural 
adjustment  policy  effects.  As  we  must  have  spelled-out  earlier,  in  the  mid  1980’s  most 
indebted African countries were imposed policies of privatization and liberalization, such as 
to gradually reduce the role of governments in the running of economies. It follows that, as 
these policies were implemented, public-investment influence on aggregate investment should 
have reduced over time as compared to private investments.
 Elasticities for Ivory Coast have unexpected negative signs with respect to foreign and 
public investments. These could be explained from global economic and foreign investment 
perspectives. From a global point, public investments have decreased since the 1970’s. While 
per capita grew 82% in the 1960’s (reaching a peaks of 360%), it shrank by 28% and 22% in 
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the  1980s  and  1990’s  respectively.  The  1994  devaluation  of  the  CFA franc  only  further 
depreciated public investment values. Thus the decrease in public investments with respect to 
population growth is quite understandable. On the other hand prospects of decrease in FDI 
(which  constitutes  between 40% and 45% of  the total  capital  of Ivorian firms),  could be 
explained through the key role France plays in contributing around 55% to 60% of the total 
capital of these Ivorian firms. At the turn of the Millennium, Ivorian political crisis spurred-up 
anti-French sentiment which led to a massive exodus of French citizens and investments from 
the country. This provides some explanation as to why FDI will decrease 7 times the rate of 
public investment for the same percentage increase in population.  
Increase in public and private spending in Swaziland can somewhat be elucidated from 
considerable spending in the 1990’s. Much of this increased spending was tilted to current 
expenditures related to wages, transfers and subsidies. Swaziland has one of the highest levels 
of  public  spending  on  the  African  continent,  with  a  wage  bill  of  over  15%  of  GDP, 
representing more than 55% of public spending.
Depletion of public  spending and increase  in  domestic  investment  in  Zambia  with 
respect  to  population  growth  could  be  understood  from  structural  adjustment  reforms 
undertaking by the country in the 80’s. By the mid-1980’s Zambia with respect to GDP was 
one  of  the  most  indebted  nations  in  the  world.  Austerity  measures  imposed  by the  IMF 
enabled it to decrease public spending and introduce more market-based economic policies. 
The New Economic Recovery Program of 1988 introduced with the influenced of the IMF 
was later reinforced by Chiluba’s economic reforms from 1991 to 2001.  
5.2 Policy Implications
Overall  policy  recommendations  for  sampled  countries  are:  (1)  birth  control  and 
family planning, especially in Ivory Coast that has suffered considerably from depleting per 
capita due to rising population and  low GDP growth since the 1970’s; (2) improvement of 
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private enterprise with policies that empower the working force to be less reliant on the public 
sector for employment. 
For specific economic implications: (1) Ivory Coast should consider serious reforms 
so as to attract more foreign investments. Much should also be done in a bid to spur up private 
investments. If all goes to plan as empirically justified above, it is likely that the country faces 
even  more  political  instability  due  to  rising  unemployment  as  unemployed  youths  could 
recourse to crime and factional  interest  which could seriously compromise national  unity, 
peace  and  security;   (2)Swaziland  should  adopt  measures  that  would  decrease  public 
spending. As we have pointed out earlier, over 55% of its public spending is in the wage bill. 
The government  cannot keep supporting rising unemployment by constantly increasing its 
wage bill. Therefore policies that work towards gradual replacement of public employment 
with private careers could largely benefit the kingdom in a distant future; (3)Zambia should 
continue on its path of reforms, giving much priority to foreign investment; (4) The Congo 
Republic should adopt policies that could improve private investment especially the feeling of 
investment security. 
6. Conclusion
The role  of  Africa in  world  demographic  change is  primary  and consequences  on 
future investment dynamics  could provide some insight on how unemployment,  economic 
migration  and  other  issues  resulting  there-from could  be  addressed.  Using  Johansen  and 
Granger-causality  models  on  data  from  1977  to  2007,  we have  investigated  effects  of 
population growth on investment. Our study reinforces the lack of consensus over the impact 
of  demographic  change on economic  growth.  Empirical  results  have  enabled  us  to  infer: 
population growth in the post-independence  era has for the most  part  depleted per capita 
income and significantly decreased living standards in most sampled countries. Projections 
seem  to  reveal  very  dire  long-run  consequences  if  measures  are  not  taken  to  address 
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unemployment  and  economic  migration  issues  resulting  from  the  continents  significant 
demographic  increase.  Main  findings  are,  in  the  long-run,  population  growth  will:  (1) 
decrease  foreign  and  public  investments  in  Ivory  Coast;  (2)  increase  public  and  private 
investments in Swaziland; (3) deplete public investment but augment domestic investment in 
Zambia;  (4)  diminish  private  investment  and improve  domestic  investment  in  the  Congo 
Republic  and  Sudan  respectively.  For  policy  implications,  the  positive  linkage  between 
population growth and investment growth in the long-term should be treated with extreme 
caution,  unless  investment  measures  are  adopted  to  utilize  accruing  work  force.  Family 
planning and birth control policies could also be considered in countries with little  future 
investment avenues.
Future research could focus on age-dynamics  in a bid to better  account for 
investment-factor  productivity  with  respect  to  age-structured  work  force.  Seemingly,  a 
parallel  analysis  based  on the  quality  of  labour;  with  parameters  like  health  and type  of 
secondary education; amongst others, could provide more understanding of this phenomenon.
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